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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE FARM MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JACK B. HOLT, ROMA K. HOLT,
TSOSIE B. YAZZIE, ROBERT A.
ROWLEY, SR., ROBERT A. ROWLEY, JR., ERLE T. JONES, VIVIAN TWITCHELL, KENT PENDLETON, MRS. KENT PENDLETON,
JOSE OAONA, JOHNNIE GAONA
YAKI, GILBERT JOHNSON and
TONI KEE BAHE,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 13691

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory relief in which the
plaintiff-appellant, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff,
in its Complaint sought (1) "a determination of coverage" afforded by its auto insurance policy and (2) a
further determination as to the "legal relationships of
the parties" to the action.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court determined with respect to the
coverage question that plaintiff-appellant's insurance
policy applied to the accident in question and that deterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mination was affirmed on appeal by this Court Following affirmance of the coverage question the injured
defendants-respondents, hereinafter referred to as respondents, moved, on the basis of the undisputed facts
in the record, for a determination that they are entitled
to the proceeds of the insurance policy together with
interest and attorney's fees. The lower court ruled that
the respondents are entitled to the insurance proceeds
and interest but awarded no attorney's fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's
Judgment filed April 22,1974 in which they were awarded
the insurance proceeds together with interest but denied
an attorney's fee.
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S
On October 3, 1970, an automobile driven by Tsosie
B. Yazzie crossed over the center line of the roadway
at the crest of a hill on the outskirts of Enterprise,
Utah and collided head-on into an automobile owned by
respondent Robert A. Rowley, Sr. and driven by respondent Erie T. Jones and in which respondents
Robert A. Rowley, Jr., Vivian Twitchell (now Mrs.
Robert A. Rowley, Jr.) and Erie T. Jones, as well as
Cindy Pendleton, daughter of respondents Mr. and Mrs.
Kent Pendleton, were riding. (R. 1, p. 4)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As a result of the collision, Cindy Pendleton was
killed and respondents Rowley, Jr., Twitchell (now Mrs.
Rowley) and Jones suffered severe injuries for which
they have incurred aggregate expenses of approximately
$14,000.00 for necessary medical treatment and related
attention. (R. 18, pp. 2-4) Also as a result of the collision,
the automobile of Robert A. Rowley, Sr., having a market
value of $1500.00, was totally destroyed. (R. 18, p. 2)
The investigating officer's report of the accident
(R. 18, Exhibit "A") shows, and it is without dispute in
the record, that Erie T. Jones, the driver of the car in
which Rowley, Jr., Twitchell and Jones and the deceased
Cindy Pendleton were riding, did not see that the car
operated by Yazzie was on the wrong side of the road,
because of the abstraction! posed by the crest of the hill,
until immediately before the accident. The report further shows that Jones immediately applied the brakes
upon discovering the Yazzie vehicle on the wrong side
of the road but was not able to avoid the accident.
Plaintiff State F a r m has not questioned the accuracy
of the investigating officer^ report or Yazzie's responsibility for the accident. Nor has plaintiff asserted that
Jones was in any way at fault in the accident. The facts
set forth in the affidavit filed in support of repondents'
Motion (R. 18) are not controverted or questioned in any
way.
This suit for declaratory relief was filed by plaintiff just two and one-half months after the accident.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Complaint contains not only detailed allegations
regarding insurance coverage but also refers to the
accident, the consequent bodily injuries and property
damage and the wrongful death of Cindy Pendleton.
Further, the Complaint specifically refers to the "claims
for bodily injury, ivrongful death amd property damage"
against plaintiff's insured driver, Tsosie B. Yazzie,
and recites that "it is essential that a determination
of coverage be made by this Court and that the legal
relationships oj the parties to this action and under
the written contract of automobile insurance be determined." (E. 1, p. 3) (Emphasis added.)
The Answer and Counterclaim filed by the respondents specifically admits that "the legal relationships of
the parties (should be) determined." (B, 2, p. 2) In
reference to the accident and the resulting injuries and
wrongful death, the Counterclaim alleges that "all conditions precedent to the liability of plaintiff under said
policy (of insurance) have been performed." (E. 2, p. 3)
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff has filed no reply to the
Counterclaim and the record contains no allegation or
claim by plaintiff disputing this latter allegation.
Both plaintiff and the injured respondents moved
for Summary Judgment on the issue of coverage under
the insurance policy issued by plaintiff. At the hearing
on the respective Motions for Summary Judgment plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court that the only issue
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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between the parties was that of coverage. He offered,
in the event it were determined that the policy afforded
coverage for the accident in question, to pay the policy
proceeds of $20,000.00 into court. (R. 22)
A determination by the lower court, following argument, that the policy afforded coverage for the accident
in question (R. 9, 10) was affirmed by this Court on
appeal in a unanimous decision. (R. 15; 28 Utah 2d 426,
503 P.2d 1205)
The issue of coverage thus having been determined,
counsel for respondents requested through plainiff's
counsel that payment be made of the policy amount.
Plaintiff's counsel in turn suggested that since payment
was only a formality it should be arranged directly
through plaintiff's agent at Cedar City, Utah, Mr. Paul
S. Searcey. (Transcript of hearing on Dec. 11, 1973, p.
11) This contact was made as suggested by counsel.
In the expectation that the payment would be received as requested, and as intimated by opposing counsel, Mr. Winder, and the agent, Mr. Searcey, counsel for
respondents worked out an agreed division of the insurance proceeds among the injured respondents and submitted the same to the lower court for approval. (R. 17;
transcript of hearing on Dec. 11,1973, pp. 6-9)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After considerable delay without receiving payment
from plaintiff, respondents' counsel requested that interest and attorney's fees be added to the sums due under
plaintiff's policy. Soon thereafter plaintiff engaged new
counsel, Mr. Ivie. Surprisingly, he advised that the
plaintiff would pay nothing unless respondents first
gave a complete release of all claims and abandoned
their claim to interest and attorney's fees. Plaintiff
refused respondents' written offer to accept payment
under plaintiff's policy and reserve for later determination the claims of respondents for interest and attorney's
fees. (Transcript of hearing on Dec. 11, 1973, pp. 6, 11,
14)
Thereupon respondents moved, on the basis of the
files and records before the Court and with an Affidavit
and a Memorandum in support, for a Judgment requiring
that plaintiff pay to the respondents the sums due under
its policy together with interest and attorney's fees.
Following argument on the Motion, and nothing
having been submitted or claimed in opposition to the
undisputed facts in the record upon which respondents
relied, the Lower Court ruled in favor of respondents,
except as to attorney's fees, (R. 22) and entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
accordingly. (E. 25) The Court's Findings of Fact recite
the undisputed fact that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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From the time of the accident it was readily apparent to persons making reasonable inquiry that
the injuries and expenses incurred by the defendants Rowley, Twitchell, Pendleton and Jones
would far exceed the $20,000.00 bodily injury
coverage and applicable property damage coverage of $1500.00, being the fair market value of the
Rowley vehicle, provided under plaintiff's policy.
and the further undisputed fact that
This action was commenced by plaintiff in order
to obtain a determination as to whether or not
its policy of insurance afforded coverage for said
accident and the Counterclaim filed therein fairly
raised the issue of liability as between plaintiff
and these moving defendants.
Now, for the second time in this case, plaintiff has
appealed to this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT DISTRICT COURTS MAY SETTLE AN ENTIRE CONTROVERSY
AND ENTER BOTH DECLARATORY AND COERCIVE
DECREES.
Appellant's position that the lower court was empowered to determine only the narrow coverage question
in this case is not only inconsistent with the allegations
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of its own Complaint and the Answer and Counterclaim,
as noted above, but is contrary to applicable cases and
authorities as will be noted below.
The Complaint, as noted above, seeks not only a determination of the narrow coverage question, but specifically prays in the broadest of terms for a determination
of "the legal relationships of the parties to this action
and under the written contract of automobile insurance.''
(Emphasis added.) The Complaint refers, moreover, to
the very same "claims for bodily injury, wrong fid death
and property damage" which are involved in this appeal.
It is surprising and disturbing, in view of the fact
that these issues are raised in plaintiff's own Complaint,
and specifically assented to by the respondents in their
Answer and Counterclaim, that the plaintiff should claim,
as it now does, that the lower court had no power or authority to determine the very issues raised by the pleadings and as to which there is still no factual dispute in
the record. This position is not only inconsistent with
plaintiff's own pleadings and the conduct of its first
counsel and its agent but it is unjust. Even now, plaintiff makes no claim that on the merits respondents are
not entitled to the insurance proceeds. Rather, it claims
that, notwithstanding the lack of any factual dispute,
the respondents must go through the time-consuming
and costly process of a separate and useless proceeding
against its insured before they can reach the proceeds
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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they are clearly entitled to. Coming as it does after the
plaintiff has already forced these innocent victims, involuntarily and at considerable expense, to resist in prior
proceedings in the lower court and in this court its attempt to escape liability altogether, plaintiff's position
boTders upon the unconscionable. Plaintiff has spoken
out of one side of its mouth through its first counsel and
out of the other side of its mouth through its more recently hired counsel.
Aside from the serious practical handicaps plaintiff
seeks to fasten upon the undeserving respondents, plaintiff's position is unsound from a strictly legal point of
view. Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-1 (1953) provides:
The District Courts . . . shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations,
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. . . .
As the statutory language above cited shows, the
Court's latitude in an action for declaratory relief is not
limited to the determination of a single, narrow issue as
plaintiff suggests. Rather the Court may in a proper
case such as the present one grant subsequent relief on
other material issues in further proceedings in the same
case. Contrary to plaintiff's position it has long been
established under Utah law that declaratory and coercive relief may be granted in the same action. Gray v.
Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d 251 (1943). When declaraDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tory relief is sought, it is proper under Utah law to permit the defendant to set up his side of the controversy
by counterclaim even where this may involve relief of
a nature different from the declaratory relief initially
sought. Gray, supra, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d at 254.
Such a rule promotes judicial economy and expedites
justice by avoiding the necessity of separate suits on
claims arising out of the same occurrences and transactions and allows the Court to accord full relief to
the parties. In Gray, supra, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d
at 255-256, this Court rejected the contention that separate suits in cases such as this are necessary and stated
in language fully applicable to the present case:
We see no merit in the argument that the Court
in this case should permit the plaintiff to bring
one action to secure a declaration that contracts
do or do not give the defendants an interest in
the land and require the defendants to bring a
separate action, based on the same contracts, and
practically same factual matter, to determine
whether or not either party is entitled to a decree
of specific performance or to damages.
After a declaratory judgment is entered, the parties
may obtain supplemental relief under Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-8 (1953), to obtain enjoyment of the rights
obtained in the declaratory suit. Declaratory and coercive relief may also be sought or obtained, at different
times in the same action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consistent with the policy of the foregoing authorities, plaintiff State Farm filed this suit for declaratory
relief seeking a determination not only on its narrow
claim that the insurance policy did not cover Yazzie but
a very broad determination of "the legal relationships
of the parties to this action and under the written contract." The respondents properly counterclaimed, establishing their side of the controversy, and readily conceded that the Court should make a determination on the
coverage question and also that "the legal relationships
of the parties (should be) determined." Further, the
respondents alleged that all conditions precedent to the
liability of the plaintiff under its policy (of insurance)
have been performed. This latter allegation has not been
disputed by plaintiff.
Admittedly the lower court's initial determination
and the prior appeal to this Court purposely involved
only the limited coverage question. But the coverage
question having been resolved it was then appropriate
for the respondents to request the lower court, on the
basis of the undisputed facts, to grant the complete
relief they are entitled to. Consideration of respondents'
request by the lower court was not a proceeding for
supplemental relief on the coverage question nor a request for an interpretation of an earlier judgment as
the plaintiff claims. Thus the case of Crofts v. Crofts,
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968), can have no effect
as authority here. Eespondents properly sought to have
the Court make a determination on the separate and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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distinct question of plaintiff's liability which had been
raised by plaintiff in its Complaint and by respondents
in their Counterclaim. Respondents also sought the
equitable assistance of the Court to obtain compensation
from plaintiff for the unwarranted delay caused them by
plaintiff's conduct. Under the circumstances the lower
court was clearly empowered and authorized under the
undisputed facts in the record to consider and dispose
of the issue of plaintiff's liability to respondents. It is in
fact surprising that the plaintiff should now contend
otherwise where it made no attempt to raise any factual
issue or to dispute any of the facts relied upon by the
respondents.
POINT II
ALL

NECESSARY

PARTIES

WERE

BEFORE

THE

COURT AND RESPONDENTS PROPERLY RAISED THE
ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S LIABILITY.

A. The question of plaintiff's liability was
properly before the trial court.
Under Utah law when there is a question concerning
the coverage of an automobile insurance policy, it is
proper for the insurer to maintain an action for declaratory relief against the insured to have the issue resolved.
E.g.. Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 26 Utah 2d 50, 484 P.2d
1180 (1971).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Those claiming injuries as a result of the tortious
acts of the insured are not proper parties to an action
to determine the legal effect of the terms of the insurance policy. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v.
Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 R2d 277 (1957).
AVhere, however, an insurance carrier on its own
initiative joins the tort victims without their consent
or approval in an action for declaratory relief involving
not only the question of coverage under its policy but,
in addition, seeks a broad determination of the "legal
relationships of the parties . . . and under the contract"
it is evident that absent an objection by the innocent tort
victims the court may proceed to determine liability
of the insurance company for the damages caused to the
tort victim. In Chugg, supra, 6 Utah 2d at 406, 315 P.2d
at 281, the Court explained:
An injured party should have the right, if he desires, to have his action tried with dispatch and
without regard to any dispute between the person
who injured him and the latter's insurer or insurers. However, in this suit the trial court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and since Larsen (the tort victim) failed to object to his joinder as a party in that suit and the issue was
triable upon appeal being taken, the issues were
properly before us for review.
In the matter before the Court respondents were all
victims of the negligence of plaintiff's insured driver
and were not proper parties to the dispute between plainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff State Farm and Yazzie on the issue of coverage.
The respondents, however, elected not to object to being
joined by State Farm but instead determined to permit
the lower court in this suit to dispose of the entire dispute
between the parties as was properly their right to do so.
r

After voluntarily joining the respondents, the plaintiff now objects to full resolution of the controversy in one lawsuit claiming such action constitutes an
improper joinder of parties and a misjoinder of remedies. However, in joining the respondents plaintiff has
voluntarily waived any right it may otherwise have had
to object to the determination in this single lawsuit of all
issues in dispute between it and the respondents.
Having elected to join the respondents in this suit
and proceed in this fashion plaintiff is estopped to now
object to a full determination of its rights vis-a-vis respondents.
Rule 18(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure, permits
the joining of two claims in one action in situations where
one claim is cognizable only after the other claim has
been prosecuted to a conclusion. Rule 20(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, permits the joining of two claims if
relief is sought or if a claim is asserted against parties
jointly, severally or, in the alternative, in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences, if any question of law or
fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Court has held that an attempt by the injured
party to join an insurance carrier and the insured in
the same action will not be permitted, when a timely
objection is raised despite the liberal terms of the above
rules, because of well-established public policy. Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971);
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967);
Utah Farm Bureau v. Chugg, supra.
These cases, however, indicate two essential policy
reasons for the above rule: (1) the well-established
policy against intentionally notifying a jury in a personal
injury action of the existence of insurance which may
cover the claim; and (2) joining two claims with separate bases in the law such as a claim in negligence with
a claim in contract. Young v. Barney, supra. Neither of
those policy considerations has any application in the
present case.
The fact that had respondents attempted to join
plaintiff in an action it could have properly objected on
either of the above bases is not material since such is
not the case here. Instead, having on its own initiative
joined the respondents without their objection plaintiff
may not now object in this case. The respondents did
not join the plaintiff but rather the plaintiff itself
brought the respondents in. By so doing it waived any
claim it may otherwise have had to object. In the present
context of the case, moreover, there is no possibility that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a jury will be influenced by the existence of the insurance
so as to prejudice plaintiff's rights or the rights of its
insured.
Nor may plaintiff argue as it does that there has been
a misjoinder of remedies. The courts are understandably
concerned where multiple claims are filed with distinctly
different bases in the law since in such actions the complexity of issues may confuse the jury and may require
that evidence be received on facts supporting certain of
the claims which have no relevance so far as the other
claims are concerned. Such procedure is not prohibited
but must be reviewed by the courts as a matter of sound
judicial policy. Here there are technically two claims,
one resulting from the tort and one arising under a contract. There is, however, no dispute concerning the tort
or the facts surrounding it. Plaintiff has made no claim
that Yazzie was not responsible for the accident nor any
claim that the respondent Jones contributed in any way
to the accident. Yazzie's responsibility for the accident
is clearly established. As the record shows without
question, any claim that Yazzie was not responsible would
be devoid of merit. Additionally, because of the great
damage that the respondents have suffered, no claim
can be made that respondents' damages do not exceed
the amount of the policy. Such claims have not been made
here, but if made, would be frivolous and would tax
heavily the credibility of anyone making such a claim.
Thus, although as a matter of policy, tort and contract
claims are often tried separately, the reasons for doing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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so do not apply here. In this case, where the facts are
undisputed, where the pleadings of both the plaintiff
and the respondents clearly raise the broad issues of
liability and where the plaintiff insurance company has
waived any claim by itself joining the respondents and
raising the very issues involved in this appeal, the competing policies of judicial economy and the provision of
an expeditous and complete resolution of the litigants'
claims must predominate. Under the present facts it is
proper for all claims arising out of this accident to be
considered in this single lawsuit.
B. All conditions precedent to plaintiff's
liability under the insurance policy were fulfilled. *
In addition to its agreement with plaintiff that the
broad issues involved in the "legal relationships of the
parties . . . and under the written contract" should be
determined, it should be noted that in answering plaintiff's Complaint the respondents stated in their Counterclaim that:
All conditions precedent to the liability of plaintiff under said policy have been performed.
This pleading to which plaintiff filed no reply
properly puts plaintiff on clear notice of the claims
which the respondents submitted to the lower court
and which are now involved in this appeal. Despite this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notice and despite the opportunity to deny the contention and despite every opportunity given the plaintiff to dispute the facts in the record on which respondents relied and upon which the lower court based its
ruling, plaintiff has never chosen to do so. The conclusion is inescapable that the respondents' position, accepted by the lower court, is sound. Plaintiff's objections to the lower court's ruling rest not on the merits
but on technical procedural grounds which are unsupported by applicable authorities as noted above.
Long after the coverage issue was resolved plaintiff has attempted to claim that Yazzie, the only indispensable party to its original action for declaratory judgment, was never properly served. Not only
is this assertion untimely, but the record is devoid of
any support for this claim. In any event plaintiff itself
named Yazzie as a party and it should have had him
served.
Plaintiff State Farm represents that it is pursuing
this appeal to protect Yazzie's interests. Such is not so.
Respondents have repeatedly offered, in exchange for
the payment to them of the insurance proceeds, to give
plaintiff a general release subject only to a reservation
of its limited claims for interest and attorney's fees.
This offer, if accepted, would terminate any further
exposure of Yazzie to liability from respondents.
Plaintiff has consistently refused this offer, in an apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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parent attempt to coerce respondents into waiving these
claims as to which they desired to obtain a determination. Plaintiff's concern therefore cannot be for its insured as it claims. Bather, it seeks to avoid its duty to
compensate the respondents for its unreasonable delay
in settling these obviously meritorious claims.
The record clearly indicates, and respondents have
never disputed the fact, that driver Yazzie has no defense and his liability for this accident is clear. For
plaintiff to represent that its obligation to Yazzie pre^
vents it from paying the proceeds to respondents in
exchange for a general release, reserving only the claims
of interest and attorney's fee demonstrates a lack of
responsibility not only to its insured but a disregard
of its duties to the public. The parties were properly
before the Court as a result of the plaintiff's own initiative and because the issue of plaintiff's liability was
clearly and properly raised, as noted above, and there
being no dispute concerning plaintiff's insured's responsibility for the accident, the trial court properly
determined plaintiff's liability. The record, without
dispute, shows that all conditions precedent to plaintiff's liability under its policy have been performed.
These innocent victims of the accident should not be
forced to take further, needless procedures to obtain
payment. Such a useless procedure would merely be a
mockery and an elevation of form over substance.
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POINT III
UNDER LEGAL AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER INTEREST
FROM OCTOBER, 1970 ON THE FACE OF THE POLICY.

The coverage afforded under plaintiff's policy is
$20,000.00 plus property damage. It cannot be seriously argued that this amount is even near sufficient to
cover the damages caused by the accident to the respondents Rowley, Twitchell (now Mrs. Rowley),
Pendleton, and Jones. Thus, it is manifest that from
the time of the accident these respondents were entitled
to receive at least the full amount of the policy. The
plaintiff resisted payment and instituted this declaratory action in which its denial of coverage was determined to be without merit. The decision of the lower
court, affirmed by this Court, makes this clear.
In Utah the right to interest is not dependent upon
whether the damages are liquidated or unliquidated but
upon whether the injury and consequent damages are
complete. Wilson v. Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 506, 174
P. 847 (1918); Fell v. V. P. Railway Company, 32 Utah
101, 88 P. 1003 (1907). See also Golden West Construction Company v. United States, 304 F.2d 753 (10th Cir.
1962), and Wunderlich Contracting Compcmy v. United
States, 240 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1957). In the Fell case,
supra, for example, the defendant railroad negligently
delayed its transportation of plaintiff's sheep resulting
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in the sheep being left for a long period of time without
food or water. Many of the sheep died and the others
shrank in weight. The lower court found damages in
favor of the plaintiff and awarded interest from the
date of the injury.
On appeal the defendant railroad argued that since
the action was for unliquidated damages sounding in
tort, interest could not be allowed until the loss or
damage had been ascertained at the trial. In Fell,

supra,

32 Utah 101, 88 P. at 1007, this argument was rejected
by the Supreme Court as follows:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest
should be ajlotwed before judgment in a given
case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but whether
the injury and consequent damages are complete
and must be ascertained as of a particular time
and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value, which the court or
jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather
than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as
for future injury, or for elements that cannot
be measured by any fixed standard of value.

Although, technically speaking, the Fell case involves a claim for injury to personal property (livestock)
rather than for personal injuries the reasons stated for
awarding interest in that case apply even more strongly
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in the present case. That State Farm was obligated under its policy to pay the full policy limit was obvious
from the time of the accident since the damages and expenses so far exceeded the available insurance. In this
sense the amount to be paid, insofar as State Farm is
concerned, was clearly ascertainable, set and complete. In
no sense could it be said that the $20,000.00 due was
unliquidated or unacertained. In this respect this case
is much stronger than the Fell case where damages remained uncertain until sales were made and market
prices reviewed to determine actual losses and there was
no limit on what could be recovered as is the case here.
Another important difference exists between the
ordinary personal injury case and the facts of this case.
Rather than categorizing this case as a claim for personal
injuries, since Yazzie's liability for the accident remains
uncontested, it should be properly categorized as a contract action, as was the situation in Fell. Plaintiff has
guaranteed to pay the limit of its policy in the event that
its insured incurs liability up to that amount. Were this
a case where the amount of damages might be less than
the policy limit plaintiff could have justified its refusal
to pay until a judgment fixed the amount.

However,

where plaintiff's insured's liability is clearly established
and where damages are clearly so overwhelmingly more
than the policy limit the claim as to the policy limit is
complete.
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An additional reason for the court to award interest
is the fact that plaintiff resisted payment and caused
the declaratory judgment to be filed all without any basis
in law. It should therefore suffer the detrimental consequences which the delay imposed upon the innocent
injured parties. As is stated in 22 Am. J u r . 2d, Damages,
§190, p. 268:
The allowance of interest rates on an attempt by
courts to award compensation to the plaintiff
for the delay involved between the date of the
injury (the time that the plaintiff was entitled to
compensation) and the date of the award or judgment. Since the plaintiff was deprived of compensation for his injury during this period to the
same extent in tort cases as in actions for breach
of contract, the general rule is that where interest
is awarded in tort cases, it is awarded as a matter
of right.
While it was the right of plaintiff to force a legal
determination as to its policy coverage such right should
not unduly injure or prejudice the injured parties. The
case here is analogous to one involving a burned building. At the time the building is burned an immediate loss
is incurred. If the insurance company chooses to bring
a declaratory judgment to question its coverage and it
is later determined that coverage existed under Utah law
the owner of the building is entitled to interest from the
date of loss on the amount due him under applicable insurance coverage. Here, the injured parties are equally
entitled to the insurance proceeds and should likewise
be entitled to interest from the date their loss was susDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tained where their injuries so far exceed the available
insurance proceeds.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated that a tort victim has a right to have
his action tried with dispatch without regard to disputes
which may exist between the person who injures him
and that person's insurer. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Company v. Chugg, supra. To disallow interest in a
clear-cut case such as the present one would only encourage the bringing of declaratory judgment actions in even
questionable cases thereby necessarily involving substantial expense and delay to innocent victims such as
the injured respondents in this case. For this reason, the
injured respondents should not be penalized in the loss
of use of money which has been undisputably owed to
them merely because of a plaintiff's refusal to pay arising out of nonmeritorioiis coverage dispute between the
plaintiff and its insured. If interest is not awarded, it is
obvious that in a very real sense the plaintiff insurer
will be permitted to benefit from its unjustified denial of
coverage and its institution of proceedings against the
injured respondents if it can merely avoid payment of
interest on its obligations through the period of the
delay incident to the formal judicial 'rejection of its
invalid position. The insurer in such a case is rewarded
to the extent of its continued use without penalty of
the policy amount during the lower court determination
and the appeal. The innocent, injured parties on the
other hand must absorb not only the legal expense inciDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dent to the suit which is forced upon them but also the
loss of the use of the money they are entitled to receive
for the same substantial period. In a case such as this
where liability of the insured is clear from the outset, and
where the respondents have obviously suffered damages
far in excess of the policy limits, thus insulating the
plaintiff insurance company from ever compensating
the respondents for the unwarranted delay, the Lower
Court's award of interest should be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, both law and equity dictate that interest be allowed from the date of the injury
up until the time of actual payment.
CONCLUSION
When a declaratory judgment action is filed District
Courts have authority to settle the entire controversy
giving rise to the action. A defendant in a declaratory
judgment action may properly counterclaim and seek
both declaratory and coercive relief. Such relief may be
sought at such times and in such manner as will properly
protect the interests of the parties and resolve the entire
dispute in question.
Although it is not generally permissible to join the
insured and insurance company as parties to the same
lawsuit, where the insurance company elects to join the
victims of the insured's action to a lawsuit against its
insured, such rule does not apply. By electing to join
the innocent victims in the lawsuit without their perDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
mission the insurance company waived any right it may
have had to claim that potential prejudice would result
from this procedure. If there is no dispute on the facts
the tort action and contract action may proceed in the
same lawsuit where it is evident that such procedure
cannot confuse a jury and will aid in obtaining an expeditious and complete resolution of the dispute.
Where, as here, the amount of damages to the respondents is clearly established in the record to be far
in excess of the insured's liability, and where the facts
giving rise to such liability were not in dispute, respondents are entitled on legal and equitable principles to recover interest on the insurance proceeds. Plaintiff insurance company has and claims no meritorious defense
to liability. Plaintiff's attempts to prolong this dispute
through further useless proceedings raises serious questions concerning its good faith, particularly in view of
its own pleadings in the case and the conduct of its
attorney and its agent.
Respectfully submitted,
REED L. MARTINEAU
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for:
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys far DefendantsRespondents Rowley, Jones and
Pendleton
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